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Metaphor and Criticism 
Many aestheticians observe that we often employ colourful figurative 
language in appreciative descriptions of artworks and natural objects. Kant 
writes that ‘we call buildings or trees majestic and stately, or plains laughing 
and joyful; even colours are called innocent, modest, soft because they excite 
sensations containing something analogous to the consciousness of the state 
of mind produced by moral judgements.’1 Frank Sibley notes that ‘when we 
employ words as aesthetic terms we are often making and using metaphors’:2 
we might describe ‘a passage of music as chattering, carbonated, or gritty, a 
painter’s colouring as vitreous, farinaceous, or effervescent, or a writer’s style 
as glutinous, or abrasive.’3 Many contributors to the literature on aesthetic 
description stemming from Sibley’s paper have repeated or built upon this 
observation. 
 My aim in this paper is to answer the question: why do critics use 
metaphor so often in appreciative description? The prevalence of metaphor in 
criticism has sometimes been taken to reveal something important about 
aesthetic experience. Kant takes the kinds of descriptions he mentions to 
support his view that we experience the beautiful as a symbol of the morally 
good. Nelson Goodman argues that reflection on metaphorical descriptions of 
                                                        
1 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement, trans. James Creed Meredith and ed. Nicholas Walker 
(O.U.P., 2007), Ak. 5: 354. 
2 Frank Sibley, ‘Aesthetic Concepts,’ in Approach to Aesthetics: Collected Essays on Philosophical 
Aesthetics, ed. John Benson, Betty Redfern and Jeremy Roxbee Cox (O.U.P., 2001), p. 2.  
3 Ibid., p. 2n2. 
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artworks reveals how artistic expression differs from forms of artistic 
representation such as depiction.4 Roger Scruton holds that metaphors 
express an experience of perceiving-as, and that the frequent use of metaphor 
in aesthetic description therefore indicates that aesthetic experience is itself an 
experience of perceiving-as.5  
 My own approach to this question will be to consider what critics 
achieve by using metaphor. Whatever the use of metaphor in criticism reveals 
about aesthetic experience or other matters, it certainly reflects something 
about criticism. It enables critics to achieve what they are trying to achieve. 
What, then, are they trying to achieve? And what makes metaphor such an 
effective way of achieving it?  
 To answer these questions, we first need a good account of what 
metaphors communicate. I shall begin by outlining the account of metaphor I 
have defended elsewhere. I shall then defend my view against those who 
would deny that it applies to art-critical metaphors.   
 With this account in place, I shall then draw a distinction between two 
kinds of art-critical metaphor. This distinction has not, to my knowledge, 
been previously recognized; but drawing it is essential to understanding the 
function of metaphor in criticism. I shall then provide my account of what 
metaphor enables critics to achieve and of why it is so well-suited to 
achieving it.                                                          
4 Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, 2nd Edition 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1976), ch. 2. 
5 See Roger Scruton, Art and Imagination (London: Methuen, 1974). 
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The Minimal Thesis  
I have defended an account of metaphor I call the ‘Minimal Thesis.’6 
This view is, I have argued, modest enough to be broadly consistent with 
many major theories of metaphor; and I have defended it against objections to 
other accounts of metaphor that also apply to it.  
The Minimal Thesis is a claim about what someone who understands a 
metaphor is given to understand. It is neutral about whether what such a 
person is given to understand is speaker’s meaning, semantic content, what is 
said, what is conversationally implicated, what she is made to notice, etc. It is 
not a claim about whether what she is given to understand is the meaning or 
content of the metaphor. It is therefore not an answer to many of the 
questions to which many of the best-known claims about metaphor, such as 
simile theories, Max Black’s interaction theory, Davidson’s denial that 
metaphors have a meaning other than the literal meaning of the words of the 
sentence, etc., are answers. This is what makes the thesis minimal. 
To state the Minimal Thesis, I must make a distinction between two 
kinds of property. I call likenesses such properties as being like this tomato and 
being like a cow. I call likeness-makers for a certain likeness properties that give 
something that likeness. If this tomato is red, then redness is a likeness-maker 
for the likeness, being like this tomato. Sometimes, when we speak of ‘the 
likenesses’ or ‘the similarities’ that there are between two objects, we are 
talking about the properties that make them alike – that is, the likeness-
makers. But I am not using the word ‘likeness’ in this way.                                                          
6 See [reference removed for blind review].  
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 I call the expression(s) in the metaphor that are used metaphorically 
‘the metaphorical element(s)’ of the metaphor. For example, the word ‘sun’ is 
used metaphorically in ‘Juliet is the sun’. I call what is characterized with the 
metaphorical element the ‘subject’ of the metaphor. Juliet is characterized 
with the word ‘sun,’ and so she is the subject.  
 It may be that some metaphors do not characterize anything as having 
certain properties. For example, one might want to say that retorting, ‘Juliet is 
not the sun’, does not characterize Juliet as having any properties, but merely 
denies that Juliet has the properties Romeo characterized her as having. So 
too, one might want to say that metaphors in the antecedent or the 
consequent of a conditional do not characterize anything. If this is what we 
should say about these cases, I can accept it. My claim is about metaphors that 
characterize something as having certain properties. 
The Minimal Thesis is this claim:  
With certain exceptions (discussed below), each property a metaphor’s 
subject is characterized with the metaphorical element as having is 
either (i) a likeness indicated by the metaphorical element or (ii) a 
likeness-maker for a likeness indicated by the metaphorical element.   
For short, I shall say ‘the properties the metaphor attributes to its subject’ 
instead of ‘the properties the metaphor’s subject is characterized as having 
with the metaphorical element’. To understand a metaphor that attributes 
properties, you must know what at least some of the properties are that it 
attributes to its subject.  
  5 
 The metaphorical element indicates a likeness at least partly in virtue 
of its non-metaphorical meaning. For example, ‘sun’ in Romeo’s metaphor 
indicates the likeness, being like the sun, at least partly in virtue of its non-
metaphorical meaning. Note also that the Minimal Thesis, being a disjunctive 
claim, leaves it open whether every metaphor that attributes properties 
attributes a likeness. It may be that the properties attributed by certain 
metaphors are all likeness-makers for a likeness indicated by the metaphorical 
element, and the likeness itself is not among the properties attributed.  
 I have claimed that it is the metaphorical element that indicates what 
the relevant likeness is. But I have not taken a position on the important 
question of what determines which likeness-makers for the likeness are 
attributed by a metaphor. It is obvious, however, that no metaphor attributes 
every likeness-maker for the relevant likeness. Romeo does not attribute to 
Juliet every property the sun has. The Minimal Thesis is also neutral about 
whether any metaphors attribute properties that cannot be attributed without 
metaphor.7 
 The exceptions alluded to in the statement of the Minimal Thesis are as 
follows:  
 (i) Sometimes, metaphors attribute properties that make the subject 
unlike what is indicated by the metaphorical element. ‘No man is an island’ is 
an example.                                                         
7 On independent grounds, I have criticized arguments offered in support of the view that we 
use some metaphors to communicate what cannot be communicated without metaphor. See 
[reference removed for blind review]. 
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 (ii) Sometimes, properties the possession of which is a way of 
possessing a likeness-maker (for example, determinates of determinable 
likeness-makers) are among the properties the metaphor attributes. ‘Sally is a 
block of ice’ attributes emotional unresponsiveness to Sally. Unresponsiveness 
is a likeness-maker for the likeness, being like a block of ice (physical rigidity 
being a kind of unresponsiveness). And being emotionally unresponsive is a 
way of being unresponsive. But emotional unresponsiveness is not itself a 
likeness-maker for the likeness, being like a block of ice.  
 (iii) Sometimes, properties merely believed to be, or imagined as being, 
likeness-makers for a certain likeness are among the properties the metaphor 
attributes. ‘Bert is a gorilla’ can attribute aggressiveness to Bert, even though 
gorillas, despite popular misconception, are not aggressive.  
 (iv) Sometimes, a metaphor communicates that the subject has  
likeness-makers of a certain kind K, but does not communicate, for any  
property Φness that is (believed or imagined to be) a likeness-maker for the  
likeness, that the subject is Φ. To understand certain metaphorical uses of ‘The 
forms in every Kandinsky are alive with movement,’ you must grasp that the 
forms in every Kandinsky have properties making them look like something 
alive with movement. You must grasp that they have likeness-making 
properties that are features of their visual appearance. But this metaphor does 
not tell us what likeness-makers these are.   
 All of these cases are, of course, intelligibly related to the central case in 
which likeness-makers for a likeness indicated by the metaphorical element 
are attributed.  
  7 
 Finally, it is important to bear in mind that, sometimes, a metaphor is 
also an example of another way of extending the use of an expression. For 
example, the same expression may be simultaneously used both 
metaphorically and by causal analogy. Aristotle’s examples of ‘healthy food’ 
and ‘healthy urine’ are cases of causal analogies: healthy food is such as to 
cause, contribute to, or maintain health, and healthy urine is caused by 
health.8 Many expressions are simultaneously used both metaphorically and 
by causal analogy. For example, when we characterize a pain with the word 
‘sharp,’ we do not attribute to it the property of being like something sharp. 
Rather, sharp pains are like pains caused by sharp things.  
 
What the Critic is Communicating 
If the Minimal Thesis is correct, then critics using metaphor (at least in 
the central case) attribute likenesses indicated by the metaphorical element 
and/or likeness-makers for those likenesses. If a critic describes music 
metaphorically as ‘chattering,’ then she gives us to understand that (1) the 
music is like something chattering, and/or that (2) the music is F, G, H, etc. 
Here, Fness, Gness, Hness, etc. will be properties that would make the music 
like something chattering.  
However, views inconsistent with the Minimal Thesis are common in 
aesthetics. Some aestheticians think that, in criticism, metaphors are not used 
to attribute any property to the object – even if they are so used elsewhere. A                                                         
8 See Aristotle, Topics, in Vol. I, The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes, trans. W. 
A. Pickard-Cambridge (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 106b. 
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fortiori, they are not used to attribute likenesses or likeness-makers. I shall call 
this view ‘anti-realism about metaphor.’  
 Many aestheticians claim that the fact that aesthetic terms are often 
metaphorical lends support to an anti-realist understanding of aesthetic terms 
in general. John Bender says that one thing that makes it difficult to argue that 
aesthetic properties are real is that many of them are ‘metaphorical,’9 by 
which he presumably means that (apparent) ascriptions of these properties 
are often metaphorical. So too, Sibley writes: 
I include [among aesthetic descriptions], moreover, those remarks, 
metaphorical in character, which we might describe as apt rather than 
true, for these often say, only more strikingly, what could be said in 
less colourful language. The transition from true to apt description is a 
gradual one.10 
In the same paper, Sibley also says that he is posing the question of objectivity 
in aesthetics as a question about the truth and aptness of remarks, rather than 
as a question about the possession of properties by objects. One thing that 
leads him to do this is the existence of metaphorical aesthetic descriptions. He 
explains:  
while we might replace the question ‘Is she graceful?’ by talk of 
properties, we might feel less happy, with metaphorical remarks, 
saying that a work has the property of gemlike fire or marmoreal                                                         
9 John W. Bender, ‘Aesthetic Realism 2,’ in The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics, ed. Jerrold 
Levinson (O.U.P., 2003), p. 80. 
10 Frank Sibley, ‘Objectivity and Aesthetics,’ in Approach to Aesthetics, p. 71. 
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hardness (though we might say it has properties that make these 
descriptions apt).11 
In a later paper, Sibley says straight out that figurative descriptions ‘are apt 
rather than true.’12  
These remarks suggest that Sibley endorses anti-realism about 
metaphor. It is a familiar claim that what we say with metaphor is, normally, 
not true. But if Sibley held only that a metaphor-user does not normally say, 
but may communicate, something true, he would be unlikely to describe this 
as the view that metaphors are ‘apt rather than true.’ Indeed, this formulation 
seems to have been chosen in order to exclude the possibility that apt 
metaphors are apt because they communicate something true. Similarly, if 
Sibley believed only that metaphors are not used to attribute the property the 
object is said to have, though they are used to attribute properties, he would 
be unlikely to cite the existence of metaphorical aesthetic remarks as a reason 
for eschewing all talk of properties in favour of talk of the aptness of remarks. 
So I take it that, although Sibley wrote little on metaphor, he was an anti-
realist about metaphor.  
However, the reasons given in Sibley’s (admittedly cursory) discussion 
are bad reasons to embrace anti-realism. He says that ‘we might describe 
[metaphorical aesthetic descriptions] as apt rather than true, for these often 
say, only more strikingly, what could be said in less colourful language.’ But 
the fact that we could say something in language less colourful than the                                                         
11 Ibid., p. 72. 
12 Frank Sibley, ‘Making Music Our Own,’ in Approach to Aesthetics, p. 152.  
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language we actually use is, of course, no reason at all to believe that our 
actual remark is apt rather than true. A remark’s colourfulness has nothing to 
do with its truth.  
Similarly, although it is perhaps true that ‘we might feel less happy, 
with metaphorical remarks, saying that a work has the property of gemlike fire 
or marmoreal hardness,’ that is no reason to doubt that some property is being 
attributed. It is just that we cannot be attributing the property we would have 
been attributing had we been speaking literally – which should come as no 
surprise, since we are not speaking literally. We would be equally unhappy 
saying that a brave person has the property of being a lion. That, however, is 
no reason to doubt that we attribute bravery to the person when we describe 
her metaphorically as ‘a lion.’  
So the considerations Sibley advances do not provide good reasons to 
endorse anti-realism about metaphor. The most developed and influential 
argument for anti-realism about art-critical metaphors is provided by Scruton. 
According to Scruton, a metaphor ‘attributes no property at all’ to the work.13 
Rather, we use art-critical metaphors ‘to describe something other than the 
material world,’ namely, ‘how the world seems, from the point of view of the 
active imagination.’14  
 Scruton holds that an expression used metaphorically means exactly 
what it would mean if used literally. When we say metaphorically, ‘The music 
                                                        
13 Roger Scruton, The Aesthetics of Music (O.U.P., 1997), p. 154.  
14 Ibid., p. 91. 
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is sad,’ ‘sad’ means exactly what it would mean if we were speaking literally. 
Clearly, however, we are not attributing literal sadness to the music.  
It follows, Scruton thinks, that we are not attributing any other 
property to it, either. ‘To say that the word ascribes, in this use, another 
property, is to say that it has another sense – in other words that it is not used 
metaphorically but ambiguously.’15 So we claim that we are attributing 
another property to music on pain of denying that expressions used 
metaphorically have the same sense as they would have if used literally. But 
that is unacceptable. ‘It follows that the word ‘sad’ attributes to the music 
neither the property that is possessed by sad people, nor any other property. 
It therefore attributes no property at all.’16  
There are several problems with Scruton’s position. First, it is false that 
‘To say that the word ascribes, in this use, another property, is to say that it 
has another sense.’ The same predicate can be used in the same sense to 
attribute different properties on different occasions. You do not have to use a 
word in a different sense to attribute a different property.  
A parallel will illustrate this. By parity of reasoning, we could use 
Scruton’s assumptions to show that a speaker who describes someone 
sarcastically as ‘friendly’ is not attributing unfriendliness to her – or, indeed, 
any property at all. For clearly, ‘friendly’ used sarcastically means what it 
means when used literally. Equally clearly, the speaker does not believe that 
the person described is friendly. So she is not attributing friendliness to her.                                                         
15 Ibid., p. 154. 
16 Ibid. 
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Nor is she attributing any other property. To hold that she is would commit 
one to the claim that ‘friendly’ is ambiguous. Indeed, one would have to say 
that one meaning of ‘friendly’ is ‘unfriendly,’ which is absurd. Therefore, you 
attribute no property at all when you describe someone sarcastically as 
‘friendly.’  
 Obviously, this argument is faulty. The sarcastic person is attributing 
unfriendliness to the person she describes. But she is not using any word in a 
different sense than she would be if she were speaking non-sarcastically. She 
is attributing unfriendliness by other means.  
Scruton might reply that, even though it is possible to use a word in its 
usual sense to attribute a property that is not attributed when we use it in this 
sense and speak literally, in order to show that this is actually the case with 
‘sad’ as applied to music, we must identify some plausible candidate for a 
property that is being attributed here. And this, he may claim, we cannot do. 
But even if this is true of the notoriously puzzling example of ‘sad music,’ it is 
not true of a vast range of other art-critical metaphors. In these cases, there are 
very plausible candidates for properties that are being attributed. If his case 
rests on this example, he does not have adequate support for his conclusion.  
For example, Frederick Hartt describes Christ’s head in a crucifix by 
Coppo di Marcovaldo in this way: 
  13 
The closed eyes are treated as two fierce, dark, hooked slashes, the pale 
mouth quivers against the sweat-soaked locks of the beard, the hair 
writhes like snakes against the tormented body.17  
Take the metaphor of the locks of hair as ‘writhing.’ You need only look at the 
painting to see how plausible it is that Hartt, by using this metaphor, is 
attributing to the locks the property of being like writhing snakes. So too, 
connoisseurs of Chinese jades have long distinguished between the colours of 
‘spinach,’ ‘lychee-flesh,’ and ‘mutton-fat’ jade, among many other kinds.18 
These metaphors, it seems evident, attribute shades of colour that make the 
different kinds of jade like these substances. There are many examples of art-
critical metaphors for which there are plausible candidates for the properties 
being attributed.  
 Finally, suppose one showed that neither a likeness to sad people nor a 
likeness-maker for this likeness is attributed to music with expressive terms 
such as ‘sad.’ This would challenge my view if ‘sad’ as applied to music is 
used metaphorically with the sense it has when literally applied to sad people 
(and not used metaphorically with, say, the sense it has when literally applied 
to sad gestures or sad feelings).  
                                                        
17 Frederick Hartt, History of Italian Renaissance Art, 3rd Edition (London: Thames and 
Hudson, 1987), p. 43. 
18 See Craig Clunas, ‘Jade Carvers and Their Customers in Ming China,’ The Bulletin of the 
Friends of Jade 6 (1989), p. 36; Angus Forsyth and Brian McElney, Jades from China (Bath: The 
Museum of East Asian Art, 1994), pp. 38-9, 304, 354-355. 
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But, first, it is far from obvious that ‘sad’ is here used metaphorically 
with the sense it has when applied to sad people. If ‘sad’ is applied 
metaphorically to music, and has the same sense as it does when applied 
literally to people, applying it to music would be an example of 
personification. We personify the weeping willow when we describe it as 
‘sad.’ But we do not appear to be personifying music when we speak of ‘sad 
music.’ That suggests that ‘sad’ is not used metaphorically with the sense it 
has when applied literally to sad people.  
Second, it is not obvious that ‘sad music’ is a metaphor at all. Several 
philosophers, at least, have doubted it.19 It is certainly not as obviously 
metaphorical as ‘The weeping willow is sad.’ Indeed, to assume that 
expressive terms are metaphorical is to assume that various theories of artistic 
expression are false. Philosophers often introduce the claim that expressive 
terms are metaphorical as though this assumption begs no relevant questions. 
But this is not so. If a certain version of the arousal theory of expression (to 
take one example) is correct, then to call music ‘sad’ is to say that it is such as 
to cause sadness. In that case, ‘sad’ is being used only as a causal analogy, like 
‘healthy’ as applied to food: as I mentioned above, we attribute, not health, 
but the property of being such as to cause, contribute to, or maintain health 
when we call food ‘healthy.’ And if we are using ‘sad’ only as a causal 
analogy, then we are not using it metaphorically. ‘Healthy food’ is no                                                         
19 See, for example, R. A. Sharpe, Philosophy of Music: An Introduction (Chesham: Acumen, 
2004), pp. 102-108; Paul Boghossian, ‘Explaining Musical Experience,’ in Philosophers on Music: 
Experience, Meaning, and Work, ed. Kathleen Stock (O.U.P., 2007), p. 123.  
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metaphor (not even a dead one). Expressive terms are clearly metaphors only 
if a range of theories of artistic expression are clearly false.  
 So the possibility that expressive terms do not attribute likenesses or 
likeness-makers should not trouble a supporter of the Minimal Thesis. For if 
that is so, one could justifiably conclude that expressive terms are not used 
metaphorically after all. There are independent grounds for hesitating to 
regard them as metaphors anyway. Numerous clear examples of metaphor 
are used to attribute likenesses and/or likeness-makers.   
 I conclude that these arguments do not show that the Minimal Thesis 
fails to apply to art-critical metaphors. Anti-realism about art-critical 
metaphors, widespread as it is in aesthetics, is an obstacle to understanding 
why critics frequently use metaphor. However, before explaining why they 
do, there are two very important clarifications of my position that need to be 
made.  
First, my claim is only that art-critical metaphors attribute likenesses 
and/or likeness-makers (or the properties identified in exceptions (i)-(iv)). 
This does not necessarily establish that such metaphors attribute aesthetic 
properties. That depends on what aesthetic properties are. Realism about 
aesthetic metaphor may not be sufficient to establish realism about aesthetic 
properties.  
This is important because Scruton, for one, wants to establish anti-
realism about metaphor partly because he wants to establish anti-realism 
about aesthetic properties. The assumption seems to be that, if these 
metaphors are used to attribute any properties, they are used to attribute 
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aesthetic properties. That assumption is not obviously correct. It depends, 
again, on what aesthetic properties are. If the likenesses and likeness-makers 
attributed with aesthetic metaphors are not themselves aesthetic properties, 
then an aesthetic anti-realist can happily accept the Minimal Thesis. Anti-
realism about aesthetic metaphor may not be necessary to establish anti-
realism about aesthetic properties.  
Second, the aesthetic realist can also accept the Minimal Thesis, even if 
the likenesses and likeness-makers attributed by art-critical metaphors are not 
themselves aesthetic properties. It is consistent with my position to say that 
we attribute properties in addition to likenesses and likeness-makers when we 
use some particular metaphor. Critics may often imply, for example, that the 
work is important and interesting in virtue of having the likenesses or 
likeness-makers they attribute. If they do attribute such properties, however, 
then they do not do so in virtue of using a metaphor, but in virtue of 
something else (e.g., contextual factors).  
Acceptance of the Minimal Thesis, then, does not by itself commit one 
either to aesthetic realism or to aesthetic anti-realism.  
 
What the Critic is Interested In 
 So much, then, for what the critic communicates. A further important 
point is this. To say that critics attribute likeness-makers for a certain likeness 
is not to imply that the critic is always interested in the fact that those 
properties make the object have that likeness. Sometimes, the critic is indeed 
interested in those properties because they give the object the likeness. 
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However, sometimes she is interested in these properties, but not for this 
reason. Some examples will make this clear. 
 The critic is often interested in the fact that certain properties give the 
work a certain likeness. Hartt’s metaphor of the locks of hair ‘writhing like 
snakes’ is an example. Hartt is explaining how the details of the picture 
combine to produce ‘a total effect of the greatest expressive power.’20 A 
certain shape – call it S – gives the locks of hair this likeness. The fact that the 
locks of hair have S does not, by itself, help explain the work’s expressive 
power. But the fact that S makes the locks like writhing snakes does help 
explain this, for writhing snakes are full of tension, energy, etc. 
Another example is Bernini’s colonnade around St Peter’s Square. This 
has been compared to a pair of arms embracing the pilgrims. The fact that the 
colonnade’s shape makes it resemble a pair of embracing arms is of interest. 
The colonnade itself expresses welcome by resembling arms that do.   
This is not to say that the critic is only interested in the fact that the 
locks of hair are like writhing snakes, or in the fact that the colonnade is like a 
pair of embracing arms. The critic is interested in the fact that S makes the 
locks like writhing snakes. This is an importantly different fact. If a different 
shape had made the locks like writhing snakes, the work might be less 
powerfully expressive. The likeness-making property, and not merely the 
likeness, is of interest here. It is just that one reason why the likeness-making 
property is of interest is that it gives the work that likeness. By giving the 
work that likeness, it helps make it powerfully expressive.                                                           
20 Hartt, History of Italian Renaissance Art, p. 43. 
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Sometimes, by contrast, the likeness-makers are of interest, but not 
because they give the work the likeness. Victor Hugo says of Hamlet: 
In this tragedy … everything floats, hesitates, delays, staggers, 
becomes discomposed, scatters, and is dispersed. Thought is a cloud, 
will is a vapour, resolution a crepuscule; the action blows each moment 
in an inverse direction, man is governed by the winds.21  
Take the metaphor, ‘will is a vapour.’ Hugo is interested in the fact that 
Hamlet’s will has certain properties. These properties make his will like a 
vapour. However, Hugo is not interested in these properties because they 
make his will like a vapour. The likeness to a vapour does not have the sort of 
importance here that the likeness of the locks to writhing snakes has in 
Coppo’s crucifix.  
Another example is art historians’ description of the drapery in late 
fifth-century Greek vase-painting as being drawn in ‘the spaghetti style.’22 As 
Figure 1 shows, this description is used because there are many lines of 
drapery-folds drawn close together, making the drapery resemble spaghetti. 
The critic is not interested in the fact that the drapery resembles spaghetti. It is 
hard to imagine what relevance that could have to the appreciation of ancient 
Greek vase-paintings. Rather, her interest is in a certain way of looking, which 
makes the drapery look like spaghetti.  
                                                        
21 Victor-Marie Hugo, excerpt from William Shakespeare, in The Romantics on Shakespeare, ed. 
Jonathan Bate, trans. A. Baillot (London: Penguin, 1992), p. 350. 
22 Whether or not the phrase ‘the spaghetti style’ is itself a metaphor, one could certainly 
communicate the same thing by describing the drapery as ‘spaghetti.’  
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[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
Figure 1. Red-figured squat oil- or perfume-jar (lekythos), in the style of the Meidias 
Painter. 420-400 B.C. Detail. © The Trustees of the British Museum. All rights reserved. 
 
I should mention a significant sub-class of this second kind of 
metaphor. Frequently, when the critic is interested in the likeness-maker, but 
not because it gives the object the likeness, the likeness-maker is the property 
of being such as to provide an experience, or elicit a response, of a certain 
kind. Keith Miller describes Alan Hollinghurst’s novel The Line of Beauty in 
this way:   
Faintly perfumed and of fractal complexity, Hollinghurst’s prose 
 endows Nick with a rounded, ironical inner life. 23 
The prose is like something faintly perfumed in a key respect: it provides an 
experience of a certain kind, which something faintly perfumed also 
provides.24 The property of being such as to provide that kind of experience is 
the likeness-maker attributed to the prose. That it provides this kind of 
experience is of greater interest here than the fact that it is like something 
faintly perfumed in virtue of doing so. Metaphors that tell us the kind of 
experience a thing provides loom large in certain kinds of criticism.  
                                                         
23 Keith Miller, ‘People who can't love people,’ The Times Literary Supplement, 9 June 2006, p. 
22. 
24 It would not be to the point here to object that smelling something faintly perfumed and 
reading Hollinghurst are experiences of very different kinds. The point is that the experiences 
are in some respects alike, not that they are alike in every respect. 
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Why Critics Use Metaphor 
 We are now in a position to explain why critics so often use metaphor. 
 
(a) When the Likeness is of Interest 
 First consider the cases in which critics are interested in the fact that 
the likeness-makers give the subject the likeness. Why are they interested in 
this fact? I suggest that it is because appreciation of the work involves 
perceiving or recognizing that these properties give it that likeness. Consider 
the examples above. Aesthetically appreciating Bernini’s colonnade can partly 
consist in perceiving that the shape makes it like a pair of embracing arms. 
Appreciating Coppo’s painting can partly consist in perceiving that the shape 
of the locks of hair makes them like writhing snakes. I do not mean that 
someone who failed to perceive these things would not count as appreciating 
these works. It is not that appreciation must partly consist in this. But 
appreciation can partly consist in perceiving these things. And that is plainly 
why the critic is communicating that these things are the case.   
This suggests a partial explanation of metaphor’s prevalence in 
criticism. When critics, in describing a work, give us to understand that p, this 
is often because appreciation of the work can involve perceiving or 
recognizing that p. Appreciation, in turn, often can involve perceiving or 
recognizing that certain properties give something a certain likeness.25 By 
using metaphor, critics can give us to understand that certain properties give                                                         
25 Hereafter, for the sake of brevity, I shall drop ‘perceiving or recognizing’ and speak only of 
perceiving. 
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something a certain likeness. That is one reason why metaphor is so common 
in criticism. 
 If anything needs defending in this explanation, I assume it is the claim 
that appreciation often involves perceiving that certain properties give 
something a certain likeness. Fortunately, there is a great deal of evidence that 
this is so.  
 Allusions are a very large class of examples. Appreciating Eliot’s lines 
that begin a description of a woman in an unhappy marriage,  
 The Chair she sat in, like a burnished throne,  
 Glowed on the marble…,26 
involves recognizing that their wording makes them like the beginning of 
Enobarbus’s description of Cleopatra when she first meets Antony: 
 The barge she sat in, like a burnished throne 
 Burned on the water….27 
The evidence is not limited to allusions. Henry James’s short novel The 
Aspern Papers is about the narrator’s efforts to get the unpublished letters of a 
famous poet from an old woman and her niece. At one point, the narrator 
meets the niece in her garden and attempts to break down her resistance to 
relinquishing the papers. It has been pointed out that this scene is like the 
                                                        
26 T. S. Eliot, The Waste Land, in Collected Poems: 1909-1962 (London: Faber and Faber, 1974), p. 
56, ll. 77-78. 
27 William Shakespeare, The Tragedy of Anthony and Cleopatra, ed. Michael Neill (O.U.P., 1994), 
2.2.198-199. 
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temptation of Eve by the serpent in the garden of Eden. Appreciating the 
story involves recognizing this.  
 Discussing Raphael’s cartoon for the tapestry, The Miraculous Draught 
of Fishes, Kenneth Clark comments that the figure of ‘Zebedee … is intended 
to recall an antique river god….’28 In some Greek temples, a sculpture of a 
reclining figure was placed at either end of the line of figures in the temple’s 
pediments. This figure was sometimes identified as a river god. An example 
showing what Clark means is reproduced in Figure 2, and Raphael’s 
depiction of Zebedee, seated in a fishing boat in the same position, is given in 
Figure 3.  
      [INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]                   [INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE] 
   
 
 
 
Appreciation does not only involve perceiving likenesses the artist 
intends for the audience to perceive that the object has. John Beazley, 
discussing the development of ancient Greek Panathenaic prize amphorae, 
vases given as prizes to the victors in athletic contests, remarks: 
The Burgon vase is stout and squat; let us compare it with some later 
Panathenaics…. In London B 134, by the Euphiletos Painter, about 530, 
the neck is shorter, the body longer, and the whole vase gives a deeper                                                         
28 Kenneth Clark, ‘Raphael: The Miraculous Draught of Fishes,’ in Looking at Pictures (London: 
John Murray, 1960), p. 64. 
Figure 3. Figure A from the west pediment of the 
Parthenon. 447-432 B.C. British Museum, 
London. © The Trustees of the British Museum. 
All rights reserved.  
 
Figure 2. Raphael, The 
Miraculous Draught of Fishes, 
1515-1516. Bodycolour on 
paper laid into canvas. Detail. 
Victoria and Albert Museum, 
London. Photo © Victoria and 
Albert Museum, London. 
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impression of collected power. In London B 133, by the Eucharides 
Painter, about 480, the shape is even stronger and more compact….29                              
The Burgon vase is shown in Figure 4 alongside London B 133 in Figure 5. 
One can see why the later vase gives a deeper impression of collected power, 
and why the shapes of later vases are described as ‘stronger.’ The later vases 
are more like a taut, strong human body than the ‘stout and squat’ Burgon 
vase is. Seeing that the shape makes it like certain strong things is involved in 
appreciating it. The later vase gives a deeper impression of collected power in 
virtue of the shape giving it this likeness, whether this was intended or not. 
These likenesses are especially relevant, given the function of these vases as 
prizes for athletes.  
     [INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE]  [INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE] 
 
 
 
 
 I conclude that we can be confident in the partial explanation I have 
provided of the prevalence of metaphor in criticism. Appreciation frequently 
can involve perceiving that certain properties give something a certain 
likeness. I turn now to cases in which appreciation does not involve 
perceiving that the likeness-makers attributed by a metaphor give the subject 
the likeness indicated by the metaporical element.                                                          
29 John Beazley, The Development of Attic Black-Figure (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1986), p. 82. 
Figure 4. Attic black-figure 
Panathenaic amphora. Attributed to 
the Burgon Group. Ca. 565-560 B.C. 
British Museum, London. © The 
Trustees of the British Museum. All 
rights reserved. 
Figure 5. Attic black-figure 
Panathenaic amphora. Attributed to 
the Eucharides Painter. Ca. 500-490 
B.C. British Museum, London. © The 
Trustees of the British Museum. All 
rights reserved. 
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(b) When the Likeness is not of Interest 
 I said above that metaphors in this class include both cases in which 
the attributed likeness-maker is the property of providing an experience of a 
certain kind, and cases in which it is not. Let us first take cases in which it is 
not.  
 In the previous explanation, I said that critics often give us to 
understand that p, in describing a work, because appreciation of the work can 
involve perceiving that p. This generalization about criticism also enables us 
to explain why critics attribute these likeness-makers. In these cases, 
appreciation can involve perceiving that the subject of the metaphor has the 
likeness-maker attributed. Appreciating Greek vase-paintings in the spaghetti 
style involves perceiving that the drapery-folds are painted in a certain 
pattern. But it would be ridiculous to suppose that appreciation of them can 
partly consist in perceiving that this pattern makes the drapery like spaghetti. 
So critics are interested in the fact that the subject has the likeness-maker, but 
not in the fact that it gives the subject the likeness, because appreciation 
involves perceiving that it has the likeness-maker, but does not involve 
perceiving that the likeness-maker gives it the likeness. 
 Consider now cases in which the likeness-maker attributed is the 
property of providing an experience of a certain kind, as when Miller calls 
Hollinghurst’s prose ‘faintly perfumed.’ It is implausible to say that 
appreciating the prose involves perceiving that it provides this experience. 
Rather, appreciating the prose involves having this experience.  
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 Both of these cases, however, raise a question. We have established 
what critics are doing in each case and why they are doing it: communicating 
that p (because appreciation involves perceiving that p), and communicating 
that the object provides a certain kind of experience (because appreciation 
involves having that experience). Why, however, is the critic communicating 
these things by attributing likenesses? As I have stressed, appreciation, in 
these cases, does not involve perceiving that the subject of the metaphor has 
the likeness indicated by the metaphorical element. It only involves 
perceiving that it has the likeness-makers attributed (in the one case) or 
having a kind of experience, the subject’s capacity or disposition to provide 
which is the likeness-maker attributed (in the other case). Rather, appreciation 
involves perceiving that it has the likeness-makers attributed (in the one case) 
or responding in a certain way (in the other case). So the question arises: why 
attribute the likeness at all?  
 Of course, one might think that the critic’s metaphors do not attribute 
likenesses in these cases, but only attribute likeness-makers for a likeness 
indicated by the metaphorical element. As I said shortly after introducing the 
Minimal Thesis, it would be consistent with the Minimal Thesis to hold this 
view. But even if this is right, there still arises the question: why is the critic 
attributing these properties by indicating a likeness for which they are 
likeness-makers? Whether the likeness itself is being attributed or not, the 
critic is getting us to think of a likeness for which the properties attributed are 
likeness-makers. Given that, in these cases, appreciating the work does not 
involve thinking of this likeness, why is the critic doing this?  
  26 
 To answer this question, I must first point out two things about these 
metaphors.  
  
(i) Specificity 
Consider the following passage by John Ruskin, who describes 
arriving in Venice by boat and seeing 
the long ranges of columned palaces, – each with its black boat moored 
at the portal, – each with its image cast down, beneath its feet, upon 
that green pavement which every breeze broke into new fantasies of 
rich tessellation,  
and observing how ‘the front of the Ducal palace, flushed with its sanguine 
veins, looks to the snowy dome of Our Lady of Salvation.’30  
The first notable feature of the metaphors in this passage is that they 
are very specific descriptions. Take the metaphor of breezes breaking the 
water’s surface into fantasies of rich tessellation. There are many ways water 
looks when breezes blow across its surface. There are fewer ways it looks 
when breezes blow across its surface and make it look like something broken 
into many pieces. And there are still fewer ways it looks when breezes blow 
across its surface and make it look like something broken into pieces forming 
a rich mosaic with the colours of Venetian palaces and a greenish tint.  
Ruskin’s metaphor communicates that the waters of Venice have 
properties making them look like that. And to characterize them this way is to 
characterize them very specifically – especially in comparison with many                                                         
30 John Ruskin, The Stones of Venice (London: George Allen, 1900), Vol. II, p. 3. 
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other, more obvious alternative descriptions. Just as ‘crimson’ is a more 
specific description of a thing’s appearance than ‘red,’ this is a more specific 
description than many alternatives. The more specific description is the more 
informative; and Ruskin’s metaphor is an unusually informative description 
of the way the waters of Venice look.  
Metaphors used to communicate that the object provides a certain 
experience, or elicits a certain response, can also be very specific. The 
response itself can be characterized very specifically.  
An example is Clark’s description of The Miraculous Draught of Fishes 
(Figure 6). After a night spent without catching anything, the Apostles, on 
Christ’s command, are hauling up their nets, which are suddenly full of fish. 
Clark writes: 
A rhythmic cadence runs through the whole composition, rising and 
falling, held back and released, like a perfectly constructed Handelian 
melody. If we follow it from right to left … we see how the ‘river god,’ 
like a stoker, drives us into the group of heroic fishermen and how the 
rich, involved movement of this group winds up a coil of energy; then 
comes an artful link with the standing Apostle, whose left hand is 
backed by the fisherman’s billowing drapery, and then St Andrew 
himself forming a caesura, a climax in the line, which holds us back 
without lessening our momentum. Then, at last, the marvellous 
acceleration, the praying St Peter to whose passionate movement all 
these devices have been a preparation, and finally the comforting 
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figure of Christ, whose hand both checks and accepts St Peter’s 
emotion.31 
[INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE] 
Figure 6. Raphael, The Miraculous Draught of Fishes, 1515-1516. Bodycolour on paper laid 
into canvas. Victoria and Albert Museum, London. Photo © Victoria and Albert Museum, 
London. 
 
Consider the metaphors of the rhythmic cadence and of the standing St 
Andrew forming a caesura. A caesura is a pause near the middle of a line of 
poetry. Elaborating the rhythmic-cadence metaphor, Clark communicates 
with the caesura metaphor that the appropriate response to this part of the 
painting is like a response to a caesura in a line of poetry. He does not, 
however, communicate that it is like this response merely in that it is one of 
pausing. He characterizes it much more specifically than that. We pause here 
after having followed the line of Apostles from the right, our gaze moving 
along naturally as we attend to salient parts like the heads, shoulders, arms, 
and hands, in turn. Our attention to these salient parts as we move along is 
like our attention to the stressed syllables in a line of poetry, spaced at regular 
intervals in an intelligible pattern, propelling our attention along as we read. 
And we pause at St Andrew without finding the pause jarring, despite the 
fact that it interrupts the prior movement of our attention.  
 
(ii) Experiences 
The second thing to note about metaphors of this kind is that they tend 
to cause a reader to have, or to imagine or recall having, certain experiences.                                                         
31 Clark, ‘Raphael: The Miraculous Draught of Fishes,’ pp. 64-65. 
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What makes Ruskin’s metaphor vivid and evocative is that it tends to cause a 
reader to imagine seeing the waters of Venice. Clark’s description 
accompanies a reproduction of Raphael’s painting. It causes us to look at the 
picture and try to imagine, or to have, the kind of response he is 
communicating that the painting elicits. Other metaphors I have mentioned 
have similar effects. When you first hear of the spaghetti style, and a 
(reproduction of a) painting in that style is visible, you are likely to look at it 
to see what is being attributed.  
Many of those who have written about metaphor think there is a causal 
connection between metaphor and perception. Davidson and Scruton, among 
many others, think there is such a connection between metaphor and 
perceiving-as. Many have also thought that metaphor causes us to imagine 
having certain experiences. Aristotle says in the Rhetoric that ‘liveliness is got 
by using the proportional type of metaphor and by making our hearers see 
things.’32 George Orwell writes that ‘A newly invented metaphor assists 
thought by evoking a visual image,’33 while Richard Moran cites numerous 
philosophers and literary theorists who have held such a view.34  
However, few have seen why there is this connection. Moran discusses 
the temptation among the writers he cites to suppose, not only that metaphors                                                         
32 Aristotle, Rhetoric, in Vol. II, The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes, trans. W. 
Rhys Roberts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 1411b. 
33 George Orwell, ‘Politics and the English Language,’ in Essays, ed. Bernard Crick (London: 
Penguin, 2000), p. 350. 
34 See Richard Moran, ‘Seeing and Believing: Metaphor, Image, and Force,’ Critical Inquiry 16 
(1989), pp. 89-94. 
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cause us to imagine, but that having certain mental images ‘is what 
constitutes the full understanding of a metaphor.’35 That temptation is 
certainly to be resisted. But what is true is that, often, one cannot figure out 
what properties the metaphor attributes unless one perceives, recalls 
perceiving, or imagines perceiving the subject of the metaphor. Many 
metaphors are more or less impenetrable until you take a look at (or imagine 
or recall seeing) the subject, and see what properties make it like what the 
metaphor communicates that it is like. In many contexts, you need to see (or 
imagine or recall seeing) that the subject has certain likeness-making 
properties in order to tell that the metaphor attributes them. This is not what 
understanding the metaphor consists in: rather, it is often what enables us to 
understand metaphors. For we need to know what properties the metaphor 
attributes to its subject in order to understand it.  
It seems clear that perceiving and imagining perceiving play this role 
in our coming to understand the metaphors considered above. We look at the 
vase-painting and try to see what the speaker means by describing it as being 
drawn in the spaghetti style. To figure out what kind of way of looking 
Ruskin is attributing to the water, we try to imagine seeing water that looks 
like what Ruskin communicates that Venice’s waters look like. We also use 
imagination, whilst perceiving the reproduction of the painting, to figure out 
what kind of response Clark claims the painting elicits.  
Now this is not, I stress, a claim about every property attributed by 
every metaphor. For example, it would obviously not apply to properties one                                                         
35 Ibid., p. 92.  
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cannot perceive that something has. Moreover, it would not normally be true 
of the likeness indicated or attributed by a metaphor that (imagining or 
recalling) perceiving that the subject has that likeness is the easiest or only 
available way of figuring out what likeness is indicated or attributed. If the 
Minimal Thesis is correct, you can infer that a likeness has been indicated or 
attributed if you know that a metaphor has been used in the first place; and if 
you know which expression in the metaphor is the metaphorical element, it is 
normally not difficult to figure out which likeness it is. Rather, we often need 
perception, perceptual memory, or perceptual imagination to figure out 
which likeness-makers are attributed.36  
Why is this so? The answer is not hard to find. For many expressions 
used metaphorically, but especially those of which this claim is true, we 
cannot rely wholly or even partly on our familiarity with past metaphorical 
uses of them to figure out which likeness-makers they are attributing – as we 
often can rely on familiarity with past literal uses of an expression to figure 
out what is being communicated when it is used literally. Certainly, with 
some metaphorical uses of expressions, we can do this. Expressions like ‘pig,’ 
‘lion,’ and ‘block of ice’ normally attribute certain likeness-makers rather than 
others when used metaphorically, at least when the subject of the metaphor is 
human. For certain expressions, there are certain likeness-makers we can 
assume are being attributed when those expressions are used metaphorically 
and when the subject is of a certain kind, in the absence of indications to the                                                         
36 Or to figure out which properties, possession of which is a way of possessing likeness-
makers for the indicated likeness, are attributed.  
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contrary. In these cases, we can indeed rely on familiarity with past 
metaphorical uses of that expression. 
Many metaphorical uses of expressions, however, are not like this. This 
may be because we never have encountered a metaphorical use of that 
expression before. Vivid or interesting metaphors are often novel.  
Alternatively, it may be because we have never encountered that 
expression used metaphorically to attribute the likeness-makers it attributes 
on this occasion. The same expression can be used metaphorically in different 
contexts to attribute different likeness-makers. We attribute different 
properties when we call John Major ‘grey’ than we do when we speak of a 
‘grey area’ in morality or law.  
So a metaphor may have for its metaphorical element an expression we 
have never seen used metaphorically before, or an expression used 
metaphorically to attribute properties we have never known it to attribute 
before. If so, then we cannot rely entirely, or at all, on familiarity with past 
metaphorical uses of the expression to figure out which likeness-makers it 
attributes now. We need some other way of figuring this out. In such cases, 
perceiving the metaphor’s subject, or imagining or recalling perceiving it, is 
sometimes the only way, or the easiest way, of figuring out what likeness-
makers are attributed.  
This explains why it is novel metaphors, in particular, that have been 
singled out for their connection with perceiving and imagining perceiving. In 
the quotation given above, for example, Orwell characterizes ‘newly 
invented’ metaphors as evoking visual images; similarly, Scruton writes that 
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‘dead metaphors achieve nothing, but living metaphors change the way 
things are perceived’37; and this is borne out by considering examples of 
metaphors that prompt us to perceive or imagine perceiving. They tend to be 
novel, like Ruskin’s and Clark’s, rather than clichés.  
 
(iii) Why Critics Use Metaphor 
I said above that, when appreciation does not involve perceiving that 
the likeness-makers attributed give the subject of the metaphor the likeness 
indicated, critics use metaphor because appreciation does involve perceiving 
that the subject of the metaphor has the likeness-makers attributed. This 
raised the question of why, in such cases, critics use metaphor at all, given 
that it attributes or indicates likenesses as well. We are now in a position to 
answer this question.  
The first reason is that critics often want to get their readers to 
perceive, or to imagine or recall perceiving, that something has the properties 
that appreciation involves perceiving that it has. Metaphor tends to cause a 
reader to perceive (or imagine or recall perceiving) that the object has the 
likeness-makers it attributes. This explains why, when appreciation involves 
perceiving that the subject of the metaphor has the likeness-making 
properties, the critic uses the metaphor. By speaking in a way her reader 
cannot (fully) understand without perceiving, imagining perceiving, or 
recalling perceiving what she wants them to, she impels the reader to 
perceive, imagine, or recall what she wants them to. Attributing or indicating                                                         
37 Roger Scruton, Beauty (O.U.P., 2009), p. 124. 
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a certain likeness with a metaphor prompts the reader to look for, or to try to 
imagine perceiving, the likeness-makers for it that are being attributed.  
I have not yet defended the claim that critics often want to get their 
readers to imagine or to recall perceiving that something has properties that 
appreciation involves perceiving that it has. It is a commonplace in aesthetics 
that critics try to get their readers to perceive that objects have certain 
properties. Philosophers less often notice that critics often try to get their 
readers to imagine or to recall perceiving that something has such properties. 
But clearly this is often the case. In many contexts, critics do not presuppose 
that their readers are in a position to perceive what they describe or a 
reproduction of it. Many passages in Ruskin and Pater illustrate this. Writers 
of reviews do not presuppose that their readers have perceived the work 
under review. And critics may also describe works they do assume their 
readers have perceived, in order to get them to recall perceiving what the 
critic wants to discuss. 
 This brings us to the second reason why critics so often use metaphor 
to attribute likeness-makers of the kind I have been considering. I said that 
metaphors can characterize their subject, or the response elicited by it, very 
specifically, and that critics’ metaphors often do. On account of their capacity 
to be specific, metaphors can enable us very accurately to imagine or recall 
perceiving their subject.  
Obviously, a critic who wants to enable the reader to imagine or recall 
perceiving the subject of the metaphor wants to cause her to imagine or recall 
this experience as accurately as possible. I assume it is evident that one can 
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imagine or recall the experience of perceiving an actual object more or less 
accurately. (For the sake of brevity, I shall hereafter discuss only the case of 
imagining perceiving. What I shall say also applies mutatis mutandis to 
recalling perceiving, and to imagining or recalling responses to the subject of 
the metaphor.) If the object is a red square, for example, then you more 
accurately imagine seeing it if you imagine seeing a red square than you do if 
you imagine seeing an otherwise identical black square. This is so even if the 
square you have imagined seeing does not possess the shade of red possessed 
by the actual square. You have still imagined the experience of seeing the 
actual square more accurately than when you imagine seeing a black square, 
even though you have not imagined this experience with perfect accuracy.  
The more specific a description is, the more informative it is. Therefore, 
assuming the reader can imagine perceiving that the object has the properties 
attributed by a more specific description when she encounters that 
description, the critic can be sure of the reader getting more right when she 
uses the more specific description than she can be when she uses a less 
specific description. A reader might, of course, imagine the experience of 
seeing the red square with perfect accuracy if she is only told that what she is 
to imagine seeing is ‘a coloured shape.’ But the critic obviously does not 
ensure this by using this description. Describing the object as ‘a red square,’ by 
contrast, ensures at least that the reader imagines something square and red. 
Therefore, given that the critic wants to cause the reader to imagine, as 
accurately as possible, the experience of perceiving the object, she does well to 
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get the reader to imagine perceiving that the subject has the properties 
attributed with a more specific description.  
So metaphors not only often prompt a reader to imagine or recall 
perceiving their subjects. Metaphors that are very specific characterizations 
prompt a reader to imagine or recall this experience very accurately. A reader 
who imagines perceiving that the waters of Venice have the properties 
attributed by Ruskin’s metaphor imagines with great accuracy the experience 
of perceiving the waters of Venice. Ruskin ensures that she imagines this with 
greater accuracy than he would if he prompted her to imagine perceiving that 
the waters have the properties attributed by more obvious, less imaginative 
alternative descriptions (e.g., saying that the waters sparkle in the sunlight).  
 
Conclusion 
 We now have an explanation of the prevalence of metaphor in 
criticism.  
(1) Critics often attribute properties, in describing artworks, because 
appreciation involves perceiving that the object has those properties. 
Appreciation, in turn, often involves perceiving that certain properties give 
the object a certain likeness. By using metaphor, critics can give us to 
understand that certain properties give something a certain likeness. That is 
one reason why critics frequently use metaphor.  
 (2) Critics often want to cause readers to perceive that the object has 
certain properties, when appreciation involves perceiving that it has those 
properties; or to imagine or recall this experience accurately. So too, they 
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often want to cause readers to have, or to accurately imagine or recall having, 
the kind of response to the object that appreciation of it involves having. 
Using metaphors, especially novel ones, is an effective way of achieving these 
aims. Such metaphors are often hard to understand without perceiving, 
imagining perceiving, or recalling perceiving the object. Using one therefore 
prompts a reader to perceive, imagine, or recall what the critic wants her to. 
In addition, metaphors can be very specific, and this can ensure that the 
reader recalls or imagines this experience very accurately.  
Coleridge said of Shakespeare, ‘You feel him to be a poet, inasmuch as, 
for a time, he has made you one – an active creative being.’ If my account here 
is successful, it helps explain why, so often, engaging with art makes poets 
out of critics.  
